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BUT-FOR NASSAR, THERE WOULD NOT BE A
CAUSATION CONUNDRUM IN TITLE VII
RETALIATION LITIGATION: HOW UNIVERSITY
OF TEXAS SOUTHWEST MEDICAL CENTER V.

NASSAR MAKES IT HARDER FOR EMPLOYEES
TO PREVAIL
I. INTRODUCTION
Meet Bob. He is a chef who works for a gourmet restaurant at a
private golf club. The golf club is affiliated with a caf that operates at the
golf club and is open to the public. By agreement between the golf club
and the caf , the cafi must utilize kitchen stafffrom the golf club on an as
needed basis. Bob has worked at the golf club for almost a decade and
frequently fills in at the cafi. When Bob gets a new boss at the golf club,
things start to go wrong. His boss treats him differentlyfrom the rest of the
kitchen staff. For example, the new boss holds 15-20 minute introductory
meetings with each kitchen staff member to get better acquainted, but
spends over an hour and a half with Bob, scrutinizing his resume and
readingfrom a list of prepared questions. The new boss also starts asking
about Bob to see what kind of information others may have about his work
ethic and productivity, despite being told by Bob's former supervisor that
he is the hardest working chef the golf club has ever seen. When the golf
club hires another cook that looks just like Bob, the boss is overheard
saying, "they hired another one. " Bob's new boss has also been heard
making comments that "African Americans are lazy. " Bob is African
American.
Sick and tired of being treated differently, Bob meets with
management at the caf and asks if he can permanently work there in order
to avoid working for the golf-club boss. The caf agrees, and Bob resigns
from the golf club, making sure to tell the President of the club that the
reason for his resignation is his supervisor's discriminatory harassment,
stemming from her bias againstAfrican Americans. Instead of saying he
is sorry to see Bob go, the President rushes to the boss's defense, andfeels
the need to publicly exonerate her. The President calls the cafl to remind
management that only kitchen staff from the golf club is allowed to work
there, and Bob is no longer an employee of the golf club. The caf then
tells Bob he is out of a job.
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What one would expect to happen next in this storyline is the
typical bread-and-butter of plaintiff employment discrimination litigators:
the aggrieved employee arrives at the office, tells a similar story, and the
litigator gets to work filing suit against the employer for violating Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 Given a fact pattern similar to Bob's, the
litigator would allege two specific violations of Title VII: first, that the
employer has violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) because Bob has suffered
status-baseddiscriminationwhich prohibits employers from discriminating
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, in employment
decisions such as hiring or firing,2 and second, that the employer has
violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) for retaliating against Bob for having
opposed, complained of, or for seeking remedies for the discrimination he
faced.3 Many plaintiffs
in situations similar to Bob's "often raise the two
4
provisions in tandem.",
However, the Supreme Court's decision in University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar5 has now "driven a wedge"
between these "previously symbiotic claims" by holding that the standard
of causation a plaintiff must prove for each claim is different: a lessened
mixed motive standard applies to discrimination claims, while a stricter
but-for causation applies to retaliation claims.6 To establish discrimination,
the plaintiff employee need only show that status-based discrimination was
one among several motivating factors in the employer's adverse action.
Whereas for a retaliation claim, the plaintiff employee must prove the sole

1 See

The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2016) (providing for equal

employment opportunity laws). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 will be discussed in detail infra,
but in general it is described as "provid[ing] remedies to employees for injuries related to
discriminatory conduct and associated wrongs by employers," and "central to the federal policy
of prohibiting wrongful discrimination in the Nation's workplaces and in all sectors of economic
endeavor." Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2522 (2013).
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (defining unlawful employment practices); Nassar, 133 S. Ct.
at 2525-30 (referring to § 2000e-2(a) as "status-based discrimination" provision of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2016) (describing unlawful employment practices related to
enforcement proceedings); Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2522-23 (referring to section 2000e-3(a) as
"retaliation provision" of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). However, as pointed out by Justice
Ginsburg in her dissent, "[tihis form of discrimination is commonly called 'retaliation,' although
Title VII itself does not use that term." Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534.
4 See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2535 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting complexity of
discrimination cases).
5 133 S. Ct. 2517(2013).
6 See id.
(discussing discrepancy between standards as announced by majority's decision).
7 See id. ("An employee who alleges status-based discrimination under Title VII need not
show that the causal link between injury and wrong is so close that the injury would not have
occurred but for the act.").
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reason for the employer's retaliation was connected to status-based
discrimination.8 Thus, following the easier mixed motive standard for
discrimination claims, a complaint can survive even where the employer
can establish a lawful motive in addition to an impermissible one, but a
retaliation complaint cannot survive unless the employee proves the causal
link between injury and wrong is so closely related, that the injury would
not have occurred but-for the act. 9
Although the Court had treated retaliation as a form of
discrimination under Title VII (and thus applied the mixed motive
standard) prior to Nassar, the decision made clear that retaliation claims
now require a heightened burden of proof.10 As applicable to Bob's
situation discussed above, Bob must prove that being African American
was one of the motives for the alleged status-based discrimination, but
must also prove that his complaint about the racial discrimination was the
only reason why he lost his job. Understandably, Bob and the rest of us
may be confused as to why the standards of causation differ where
retaliation has previously been considered a form of discrimination itself.
This Note will explore the merits of the various approaches to
determining the standard of causation under Title VII retaliation claims, as
well as the purpose of Title VII in affording employees workplace
protections.1 2 Next, this Note will examine the Supreme Court's decision
in Nassar in order to analyze the efficacy of the stricter standard of but-for
13
causation set forth in the context of Title VII anti-retaliation claims.
Lastly, this Note will argue that the stricter standard is at odds with
Congressional intent.1 4 Ultimately, it will be argued that the Nassar
approach is problematic for plaintiff's attorneys, too confusing for juries,

8

See id. (explaining new standard) (emphasis added).

See id. at 2522-23 (reiterating mixed motive theory suffices for status-based discrimination
claims established by Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
10 See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2537-38 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969) ("Adverting to the close connection between
discrimination and retaliation for complaining about discrimination, this Court has held, in a line
of decisions unbroken until today, that a ban on discrimination encompasses retaliation.");
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Edu., 544 U.S. 167, 173-74 (2005) (holding in context of sex
discrimination, retaliation against person complaining is "another form of intentional sex
discrimination"); G6mez Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 479-91 (2008) (holding Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 bars discrimination and retaliation "based on age,");
CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 447-57 (2008) (finding that under 42 U.S.C. §
198 "retaliation for race discrimination constitutes discrimination based on race").
11 See cases cited supra note 10.
12 See infra Part II (providing background prior to Nassar).
13 See infra Part III (discussing Nassar).
14

See infra Part IV.
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15
and contrary to the spirit and precedent of the Title VII protections.

I. BACKGROUND: SETTING THE STAGE FOR NASSAR

A. Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1964
In order to frame the legal backdrop in which the Nassar opinion
originated, it is essential to understand the purpose and history of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the cases that followed interpreting
that statute.1 6 Congress enacted Title VII to address the pervasive problem
of employment discrimination,1 7 and it applies to almost all employers of
fifteen or more employees. 18 It proscribes discrimination in employment
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.1 9 Title VII also
makes it an "unlawful employment practice" to discriminate against any
individual because the individual has complained of, opposed, or
participated in a proceeding about prohibited discrimination. 20 Section
2000e-3(a) is referred to as the retaliation provision of Title VII, 21 and the
Court has recognized that without the anti-retaliation provision, the statusbased discrimination provision would be hollow:
There is strong reason to believe that Congress intended

15 See infra Part IV.
16 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2016).
17 See Robert Tananbaum, Note, Grossly Overbroad: The Unnecessary Conflict over Mixed
Motives Claims in Title VII Anti -Retaliation Cases Resulting from Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 34
CARDOZO L. REv. 1129, 1132 n.21 (2013) (dating race and gender discrimination to pre-colonial
America and describing its persistence). The groups chosen by Congress to fall within the
protections of Title VII had historically suffered discrimination in employment. Id.
18 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e- 17(b) (2012) (explaining definition of employer).
19 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2a)(1) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ... ").
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title, or because he has made
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this title."); Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528 (referring to § 2000e-3(a) as "antiretaliation
provisionf').
21 See Univ. Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534-35 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("Backing up that core provision, Title VII also makes it an 'unlawful employment
practice' to discriminate against any individual 'because' the individual has complained of,
opposed, or participated in a proceeding about, prohibited discrimination . . . .

This form of

discrimination is commonly called 'retaliation,' although Title VII itself does not use that term."
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added))).
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the differences that its language suggests, for the two provisions
differ not only in language but in purpose as well. The
antidiscrimination provision seeks a work place where
individuals are not discriminated against because of their racial,
ethnic, religious, or gender-based status. The antiretaliation
provision seeks to secure that primary objective by preventing an
employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an
employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's
basic guarantees. The substantive provision seeks to prevent
injury to individuals based on who they are, i.e. their status. The
antiretaliation provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals
based on what they do, i.e. their conduct.
To secure the first objective, Congress did not need to
prohibit
anything
other
than
employment-related
discrimination. 22
However, this would not achieve the second objective because it
would not deter the many forms that effective retaliation can take, therefore
failing to fully achieve the anti-retaliation provision's purpose of
"[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms ....,,21
Moreover, the anti-retaliation provision is crucial to the overall purpose of
Title VII in protecting employees because the "fear of retaliation is the
leading reason why people stay silent" about the discrimination they have
encountered or observed.24
B. Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act
In 1989, the Court considered the causation standard for statusbased discrimination in Title VII claims in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.

In particular, the Court addressed "what it means for an action to be taken
'because of' an individual's race, religion, or nationality." 26 The Court
held that the requisite standard of causation for section 2000e-2(a) statusbased discrimination claims to be a "mixed motive theory.",27 The Court

22 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. V. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006) (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01 (1973)).
23 Id. at 64 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).
24 See Nassar, 133 S.Ct. at 2534-35 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
25 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239-58 (1989) (laying framework for

analyzing Title VII discrimination claims).
26 Nassar,133 S.Ct. at 2525-26.
27 See id. (providing holding of the Price Waterhouse Court).
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explained that under such theory, a plaintiff can prevail if he or she can
show one of the prohibited traits "was a 'motivating' or 'substantial' factor
in the employer's decision., 28 Furthermore, the Court elaborated that once
a plaintiff has shown the status-based discrimination to be at least one of
several motivating factors in the unlawful employment decision, the burden
of persuasion then shifts to the employer to prove it would have made the
same employment decision in the absence of all discriminatory animus.29
Thus, Price Waterhouse established a burden-shifting framework forstatusbased discrimination claims, and concluded that the lessened-causation
standard, (i.e. mixed motive theory) applies.30
Congress later codified this mixed motive standard of causation,
and adjusted the burden shifting framework established in Price
Waterhouse by amending Title VII and other federal antidiscrimination
statutes with the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("the Amendments").31 The
purposes of the Amendments were to provide additional protections to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 against unlawful discrimination in employment,
and "to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the
scope of relevant civil rights statutes. ,1 2 Specifically, the Amendments

28
29

See id. at 2526 (explaining Price Waterhouse holding).
See id. ("In other words, the employer ha[s] to show that a discriminatory motive was not

the but-for cause of the adverse employment action.").
30 See id. at 2526-27. Ultimately, the plurality in Price Waterhouse concluded that a Title VII
plaintiff need only show that a prohibited factor contributed to the employment decision - not that
it was the but-for or sole cause. See id. at 2539 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Congress endorsed
the plurality's conclusion that, to be actionable under Title VII, discrimination must be a
motivating factor in, but need not be the but-for cause of, an adverse employment action."); see
also Joanna L. Grossman & Deborah L. Brake, Revenge: The Supreme CourtNarrows Protection
Against Workplace Retaliation in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,
VERDICT, July 9,
2013, https://verdict.justia.com/2013/07/09/revenge-the-supreme-courtnarrows -protection-against-workplace-retaliation-in-university-of-texas- southwestern-medicalcenter-v-nassar.
In its statutory form, the plaintiff's burden is to prove that discrimination was 'a
motivating factor' for the adverse decision. That alone results in a finding of
employer liability. However, upon proof by the employer that it would have money
damages, but may still be on the hook for attorneys' fees and injunctive relief.
Id.
31

See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (amending the

Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2520-21, 2523, 2538. ("This principle is
the result of an earlier case from this Court, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.
Ct. 1775, 104 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1989), and an ensuing statutory amendment by Congress that
codified in part and abrogated in part the holding in Price Waterhouse .... ").
32 See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 3 (outlining purposes of Act). The House Report
regarding
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 similarly describes the Amendment's two primary purposes:

2016]

BUT-FOR NASSAR

added subsection 2000e-2(m) which provides that "an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national original was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice."33
C. Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.
In 2009 the Court had the opportunity to address the issue of
causation that ultimately set the stage for Nassar but in the context of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).3 4 In Gross v.
FBL Financial Services, Inc., 35 plaintiff employee Gross produced
evidence at trial that age discrimination was a motivating factor in his
employer's decision to demote him.3 6 At the close of trial and over FBL's
objection, the District Court instructed the jury to enter a verdict for Gross
if they found that he was demoted because of his age; thus, age would be
considered a motivating factor if the jury determined it was a reason for the
demotion.
The jury returned a verdict for Gross, but the Eighth Circuit
reversed the holding that the Price Waterhouse "mixed motive" standard
applies only in status-based discrimination cases under Title VII- not the

The first is to respond to recent Supreme Court decisions by restoring the civil rights
protections that were dramatically limited by those decisions. The second is to
strengthen existing protections and remedies available under federal civil rights laws
to provide more effective deterrence and adequate compensation for victims of
discrimination.
H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2 (1991).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
34 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1967). The ADEA
provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer-- (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
age; or (3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this
chapter.
ld.
35 557 U.S. 167 (2009).

36 See id.at 169-70 (stating cause of action).
37 See id. at 171-73 (describing disputed jury instructions).
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ADEA.38 The Court ultimately agreed with the Eighth Circuit, reasoning
that because Title VII was amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to
codify the mixed motive standard of causation requirement in status-based
discrimination claims,3 9 Congress acted intentionally by failing to make the
same amendment to the ADEA. 40
Thus, in the absence of language
expressly permitting a mixed-motive theory of causation, the language
"because of' should bear ordinary meaning- i.e. the plaintiff must prove
that age was the "but for" cause of the adverse employment decision under
the ADEA.4 1 Ultimately, the Court determined that although sharing
similar purposes to protect employees from discrimination in the
workplace, Title VII status-based discrimination claims (allowing for the
lesser-standard) are separate and distinct from the ADEA's disparate
treatment claims (which require but-for causation).4 2
D. Smith v. Xerox Corp.
In 2010, the Fifth Circuit was tasked with determining exactly the
same issue the Court would later take up and reverse in Nassar: whether
43
the mixed-motive framework applies to retaliation claims under Title VII.
In Smith v. Xerox Corp.,44 employee plaintiff Kim Smith brought two Title
VII actions against her former employer Xerox for status based
discrimination and retaliation.45 On appeal, Xerox challenged the district

38

See id. at 172-73 (stating holding and subsequent cause for reversal).

39 See id. at 186-87 (discussing Congress's motive for passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
40 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 174. The Court discussed Congress's different actions in the

ADEA:
Unlike Title VII, the ADEA's text does not provide that a plaintiff may establish
discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating factor. Moreover,
Congress neglected to add such a provision to the ADEA when it amended Title VII
to add §§ 2000e 2(m) and 2000e 5(g)(2)(B), even though it contemporaneously
amended the ADEA in several ways . . . We cannot ignore Congress' decision to
amend Title VII's relevant provisions but not make similar changes to the ADEA.
When Congress amends one statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to
have acted intentionally.
Id.
41

ld. at 176-77.
at 176-

42 ld.

43 See Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 325-26 (5th Cir. 2010) (discussing Title VII

framework for retaliation claims).
44 602 F.3d 32 (5th Cir. 2010).
45 See id. at 320 (discussing facts of the case).

Smith alleged that Xerox discriminated
against her based on her age and sex, and then terminated her in retaliation for filing a complaint
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court's jury instructions on a mixed-motive theory of causation in regards
to the retaliation claim.46

The Fifth Circuit recognized the Court's

reasoning in Gross that the ADEA and Title VII are two distinct statutory
schemes, and but-for causation is presumed in the absence of express
language authorizing the mixed motive standard.4 However, the court
rejected this "simplified" application of Gross as set forth in Xerox's
argument; that because the wording of section 2000e-2(m) of Title VII
authorizing mixed motive theory claim doesn't include the term
"retaliation" but-for causation is the standard. 48 The Fifth Circuit reasoned
that because the Gross Court made clear that its focus was on ADEA, the

decision did not affect Title VII claims, which permits mixed-motive jury
instructions, even in the context of retaliation.4 9
Il.FACTS
A. The Creation of the Causation Conundrum: Nassar
i. Facts of the Case
Dr. Naiel Nassar, a medical doctor of Middle Eastern descent who
specializes in the treatment of HIV/AIDS, was hired to work as a faculty
member of the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center
("University") in 1995. 5 0 The University is affiliated with Parkland

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Id.at 323.
46 Id. at 323.
47 See id. at 328-29 (discussing Gross).
48 See id. at 328 ("The text of § 2000e-2(m) states only that a plaintiff proves an unlawful
employment practice by showing race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor.").
49 See Smith, 602 F.3d at 329-30 ("To state the obvious, Gross is an ADEA case, not a Title
VII case."). The court made clear its belief that the Price Waterhouse holding "remains our
guiding light," as it determined the "because of' language in the context of Title VII authorizes
the mixed-motive framework. Id.at 329. Moreover, the court noted the dissent's observation
that the Seventh Circuit has twice explained that a plaintiff must prove but-for causation in all
suits absent a contrary statutory provision. See id. at 329 n.28 ("The dissent characterizes as
'lame' our distinction between age discrimination cases under the ADEA and retaliation cases
under Title VII"). However, the court concluded that those decisions were limited to examining
the effect of remedy provisions under the 1991 Civil Rights Act amendments, and not on the
issue of whether the motivating factor framework is appropriate in a Title VII retaliation case.
See id.at 329 ("Because we believe that Gross does not unequivocally control whether a mixedmotive jury instruction may be given in a Title VII retaliation case, we must continue to allow the
Price Waterhouse burden shifting in such cases unless and until the Supreme Court says
otherwise.").
50 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013).

296

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XXI

Memorial Hospital ("Hospital"), and through an affiliation agreement the
Hospital is obliged to fill its staff physician posts with University faculty.5 1
As a University faculty member, Dr. Nassar also practiced medicine at the
Hospital?. In 2004 Dr. Beth Levine was hired as the University's Chief of
Infectious Disease Medicine, and became Dr. Nassar's supervisor at the
clinic.53
From the start, Dr. Levine treated Dr. Nassar differently.
Before
Dr. Levine even began officially working the University, she held fifteen to
twenty minute meetings with potential subordinates, yet spent over an hour
and a half
reviewing Dr. Nassar's resume in detail and asking him prepared
• 55
questions.5 5
Dr. Levine also expressed concern about Dr. Nassar's
productivity and work ethic, despite receiving assurances that he was in
fact a hard worker.56 Moreover, the following year Dr. Levine disagreed
with the hiring of a physician who was also of Middle Eastern descent, like
Dr. Nassar. When the Hospital hired the physician, Dr. Levine remarked
to another doctor that the Hospital
had "hired another one," and that
58
"Middle Easterners are lazy."
Due to Dr. Levine's hostility, Dr. Nassar engaged in discussions
with the Hospital about remaining employed there despite the affiliation
agreement, since he wanted to resign from the University to avoid Dr.
Levine's supervision.59 The Hospital verbally offered Dr. Nassar a position
as a staff physician, and Dr. Nassar proceeded to resign from the
University. 6° Upon his resignation, Dr. Nassar wrote a letter to Dr.
Gregory Fitz, Chair of Internal Medicine and Levine's immediate
supervisor, that "[t]he primary reason [for] resignation . . . [is] the

Id. at 2535-36.
52 Id. at 2523. Due to the fact that "the University specializes in medical education for
51

aspiring physicians, health professionals, and scientists ... the Hospital permits the University's
students to gain clinical experience working in its facilities." Id. By means of the affiliation
agreement, most of the staff physician positions at the Hospital are filled by faculty members. Id.
51 Id. at 2523, 2535.
54 ld. at 2523. In his complaint, Dr. Nassar alleged Dr. Levine's bias toward him
"manifested by undeserved scrutiny of his billing practices and productivity, as well as comments
that 'Middle Easterners are lazy'." Id.
55 Nassar,133 S. Ct. at 2535 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 2535-36. According to Dr. Kesier, Dr. Nassar's direct supervisor, Dr. Levine "never
seemed to [be] satisf[ied]" with his assurances that Dr. Nassar was in fact working harder than
the other physicians. ld.at 2535 (emphasis added).
57 Id. at 2536.
58 Id.
59 id.

60 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2536 (2013).
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61
continuing harassment and discrimination ... by ... Dr. Beth Levine.,
Though Dr. Nassar had met with Dr. Fitz several times to complain about
Dr. Levine's alleged harassment, Dr. Fitz sided with Dr. Levine and
thought that she should be "publicly exonerated., 62 Dr. Fitz then protested
to the Hospital, asserting that the offer to employ Dr. Nassar was
inconsistent with the affiliation agreement's requirement that all staff
physicians must also be members of the University faculty. 63 The Hospital
64
subsequently withdrew its offer to employ Dr. Nassar.

ii. Take One: The Jury Finds For Nassar On His Title VII
Retaliation Claim
65

Dr. Nassar filed suit, alleging two discrete Title VII violations.
First, he alleged that Levine's racially and religiously motivated
harassment resulted in his constructive discharge from the University, in
violation
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), which prohibits status-based
.... of 42
66
discrimination. Second, Dr. Nassar claimed that Dr. Fitz's efforts to
prevent the Hospital from hiring him was retaliation for complaining about
Levine's discrimination, in violation of § 2000e-3(a), which prohibits
employer retaliation "because [an employee] has opposed ... an unlawful
employment practice ...or ...made a [Title VII] charge.",67 The jury
found for Dr. Nassar on both claims.6 8
iii. Take Two: The Fifth Circuit Affirms Finding of Retaliation
The Fifth Circuit vacated Nassar's constructive-discharge claim,
concluding that he had submitted insufficient evidence. 69 However, citing
Smith v. Xerox Corp., ° the court affirmed the lower court's retaliation
finding on the theory that retaliation claims brought under § 2000e-3(a)-

61 Id. (alterations in original).
62 Id. at 2524. After reading the letter, Dr. Fitz expressed consternation at Dr.
Nassar's

accusations, saying that Levine had been "publically humiliated by the letter" and that it was
,very important that she be publicly exonerated." Ild.
63 Id.
64

Id.

65

See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2520.

66 Ild.
(emphasis added).

Id. at 2520, 2524, 2528.
Id. at 2536. Dr. Nassar was initially awarded over $400,000 in back pay and more than $3
million in compensatory damages. Id.
69 Id. at 2524.
70 602 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2010).
67
68
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like § 2000e-2(a) status-based claims-require only a showing that
retaliation was a motivating factorfor the adverse employment action, not
its but-for cause.7 The Fifth Circuit also found that Dr. Nassar produced
sufficient evidence to support a finding that Fitz was motivated, at least in
part, to retaliate against him for his complaints regarding Levine's
discrimination. 2
iv. Final Cut: The Supreme Court Reverses and Determines
Stricter Causation Test Applies to Title VII Retaliation
Claims
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to finally decide the proper
standard of causation for Title VII retaliation claims .
Writing for the
sharply divided Court, Justice Kennedy held that Title VII retaliation
claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for
causation, not the lessened "mixed motive" standard. 4 The Court found its
decision in Gross to be particularly relevant.
As discussed above, the
Gross Court concluded that in the context of the ADEA, a plaintiff must
prove that "age was the 'but-for' cause of the employer's adverse decision"
because the ordinary meaning of language "because of' found in the statute
is indicative of Congress's decision not to include a "careful[ly] tailor[ed]
motivating factor' claim" provision. 6 Although the whole sticking point
of the Court's decision in Gross was that despite having similar wording
and being enacted contemporaneously the ADEA and Title VII must be
read separately, the Nassar Court nevertheless reasoned that because the
anti-retaliation provision of Title VII uses the same "because of' language
as the anti-retaliation provision of the ADEA, the conclusion is the same:
but-for causation applies .
The majority concluded with two additional justifications for

71

See id.(describing holding of the case); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 2(m) ("An unlawful

employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also motivated the practice.").
72 Nassar,133 S. Ct. at 2520.
73 Id.
74 Id.at 2525-28 (explaining standards for providing retaliation claims).
75 See id.at 2527 (analyzing Gross with the facts of Nassar); see also supra note 33
(providing relevant language of 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)).
76 Nassar,133 S. Ct. at 2527.
77 See id.at 2527-28 ("Given the lack of any meaningful textual different between the text in
this statute and the one in Gross, the proper conclusion here, as in Gross, is that Title VII
retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged
employment action.").
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adapting the but-for standard of causation.7' First, the stricter standard is
needed because "claims of retaliation are being made with every increasing
frequency ...[and] ha[ve] now outstripped those for every type of statusbased discrimination except for race." 9 As a result, lessening the standard
would contribute to the filing of frivolous claims and upset the balance of
fair and responsible allocation of resources in the judicial and litigation
systems. 80
Second, although the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's (EEOC) guidance manual has adopted and applied the
motivating-factor provision's lessened causation standard to retaliation
claims, it fails to address the specific provisions and detailed scheme of
Title VII as opposed to other broad federal antidiscrimination statutes it is
not controlling.81 Therefore, the Court will not give deference82 to the
EEOC's use of the motivating-factor standard in retaliation claims.
Ultimately, the Court found that Dr. Nassar could not prove but-for
causation in regards to the retaliation claim because the affiliation
agreement between the Hospital and the University precluded the Hospital
from making Dr. Nassar the job offer. 83 Since the Hospital provided a
See id. at 2531-32 (discussing both strict and lessened causation standards).
At the time of the decision, the number of retaliation claims filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) had nearly doubled in the past 15 years,
from just over 16,000 in 1997 to over 31,000 in 2012. ld.That number has since increased to
over 38,000 retaliation claims being filed with the EEOC for the fiscal year of 2013. See United
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Retaliation Based Charges FY 1987-FY
2015, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/retaliation.cfm (last visited February 23,
2016).
so Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531-32. Justice Kennedy also expresses concern that the mixed
motive standard would make it "far more difficult to dismiss dubious claims at the summary
judgment stage." Id.at 2532.
81 See id.at 2531-32 (discussing differences between EEOC guidelines and language of Title
VII).
82 Id. at 2517, 2533 (rejecting argument that EEOC views are entitled to deference under
Court's decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)). In Skidmore, the Court held
that although rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator of the Fair Labor
Standards Act were not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, they do however
"constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance." See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139-40 (describing holding of the case).
Furthermore, the Skidmore Court concluded that agency views should be given deference where
"the policies at issue are made in pursuance of an official duty, based upon more specialized
experience and broader investigations and information than is likely to come to a judge in a
particular case." Id.However, the Court also noted that the weight of an agency's judgments in a
particular case will ultimately depend upon "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Id.at 140.
83 See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2517, 2532. The Court admitted that if the motivating-factor
standard applied to the retaliation claim, the University may be liable where "Dr. Fitz's alleged
desire to exonerate Dr. Levine" motivated his enforcement of the affiliation agreement, which
resulted in the hospital rescinding Dr. Nassar's job offer, even if it could also be shown that the
78

79 Id. at 2531.
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legitimate reason for rescinding the job offer despite the fact that retaliation
indeed could have played a role in that decision, applying the stricter butfor standard defeated Dr. Nassar's retaliation claim where he could not
prove retaliation was the only reason the job offer was rescinded. 84
v. A Scathing Dissent: The Majority Complicated An Already
Complicated Subject
In a powerful dissent, Justice Ginsburg joined by Justices Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan argued that mixed-motive theory should apply to
retaliation claims: "[R]etaliation in response to a complaint about
[proscribed] discrimination is discrimination' on the basis of the
characteristic Congress sought to immunize against adverse employment
action. 8 5 This is evident arguably because plaintiffs often raise the statusbased discrimination proscription with the proscription against retaliation
in Title VII suits. 8 6 Furthermore, the dissent points out that the Court has
long acknowledged the symbiotic relationship between proscriptions on
discrimination on retaliation, as anti-retaliation provisions "see[k] to secure
[that] the primary objective of creating a workplace where employee feel
free to approach officials with their grievances" which in turn should
eliminate discrimination in the work place. 8 Justice Ginsburg illustrates
this concept by showing that "ina line of decisions unbroken until today,"
"this Court has held," "that a ban on discrimination encompasses
retaliation, " and "[t]here is no sound reason in this case to stray from
[those] decisions."8 8
The dissent also relies heavily upon the fact that the mixed-motive
provision was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
amended Title VII with the stated purpose to provide "additional
protections against unlawful discrimination in employment," and to
"respon[d] to a number of.. .decisions by [this Court] that sharply cut

terms of the affiliation agreement precluded the hospital hiring Dr. Nassar in the first place. Id.
84 See id. at 2532-33 (detailing analysis of stricter but-for standard).
85 See id. at 2525 (emphasis in original) (quoting Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544
U.S. 167, 179, n.3 (2005)).
86 Nassar,133 S. Ct. at 2535 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[T]he ban on discrimination and the
ban on retaliation against a discrimination complainant have traveled together: Title VII plaintiffs
often raise the two provisions in tandem.").
87 See id. at 2537 (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63, 67
(2006)).
88 See id. (alterations in original); supra note 6 (detailing Court's history of finding
discrimination as encompassing retaliation, supporting application of mixed motive standard).
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back on the scope and effectiveness' of antidiscrimination laws."' 9 Thus
the overall purpose of the amendments, according to the dissent, was to
expand all anti-discrimination protections. 90 This is evidenced by the
Congressional codification of the Price Waterhouse "mixed motive"
standard applicable in Title VII discrimination claims, as well as Congress'
modification of the Price Waterhouse "burden shifting" test to make it
more amenable to employees. 91
Moreover and critical to the causation conundrum at issue, the
dissent sharply criticizes the Court's reliance on Gross-since the Court
previously found "because of' language in context of the ADEA to require
but-for causation, it is logical to assume that the word "because" in Title
VII's retaliation provision likewise bars the mixed-motive standard. 92 The
dissent points out that this is akin to reading two separate statutes together
(the ADEA and Title VII), while refusing to read two Title VII provisions
together (the status-based proscription and the proscription of retaliation).93
Thus, instead of crossing statutory lines, the dissent argues that the Court
should adhere to the standard principle of statutory interpretation that
identical phrases appearing in the same statute ordinarily bear a consistent
meaning: thus Title VII's discrimination and retaliation provisions both
require the mixed motive standard. 94 The dissent warns that requiring
juries to be instructed on two different standards of causation will cause
major confusion in future Title VII retaliation litigation:
The Court shows little regard for trial judges who must instruct
juries in Title VII cases in which plaintiffs allege both status-based
discrimination and retaliation. Nor is the Court concerned about the

89 See id. at 2538 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 2-4 (1991)) (analyzing purpose of

the Civil Rights Act of 1991) (emphasis added).
90 See id. at 2538-39 (discussing impetus of amendments to increase protection against
discrimination).
91 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2539 (2013) (explaining
codification of standard). As discussed supra, the Price Waterhouse "mixed motive" standard
allows a plaintiff to show that a prohibited factor contributed to the employment decision, but the
employer can still escape liability by showing that it would have taken the same action regardless
of the improper motive, Id.; see supra Part II.B (discussing Price Waterhouse framework). The
1991 amendments reaffirmed that any reliance on prejudice in making an employment decision is
prohibited, as section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) codified that an employer will no longer be shielded if a
proper motive, along with an improper one, motivated the adverse employment decision. Nassar,
133 S. Ct. at 2539.
92 Nassar,133 S. Ct. at 2545 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
9' See id. at 2545 ("[W]hen conducting statutory interpretation, we 'must be careful not to
apply rules applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical

examination."')

94 See id. (relying on Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232

(2007)) (declining mixed motive standard).
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capacity of jurors to follow instructions conforming to today's decision.
Causation is a complicated concept to convey to juries in the best of
circumstances. Asking jurors to determine liability based on different
standards in a single case is virtually certain to sow confusion. That would
be tolerable if the governing statute required double standards, but here, for
the reasons already stated, it does not.95
Also troubling for the dissent was the fact that when more than one
factor contributes to a plaintiff's injury, but-for causation precludes a Title
VII plaintiff alleging retaliation, as one cannot establish liability if the
firing was prompted by both legitimate and illegitimate factors.96 This is
precisely what happened to Dr. Nassar: his job was rescinded for both a
legitimate purpose (enforcement of the affiliation agreement) and
illegitimate purpose (complaining about the discrimination he faced at
97

work).

Moreover, Justice Ginsburg reflects that both "plurality and
concurring opinions in Price Waterhouse indicate[] that a strict but-for test
is particularly ill suited to employment discrimination cases." 98 Even if the
test is appropriate in some tort contexts, "it is an entirely different matter to
determine a 'but-for' relation when ... consider[ing], not physical forces,
but the mind-related characteristics that constitute motive." 99 When
assessing an employer's multiple motives, "to apply 'but-for' causation is
to engage in a hypothetical inquiry about what would have happened
if the
10 0
employer's thoughts and other circumstances had been different."
Lastly, the dissent points out that requiring but-for causation in the
context of Title VII had been rejected before. 01 As the Congressional
Record reflects, when Title VII was enacted in 1964, Congress considered
and ultimately rejected an amendment that would have placed the word
"solely" before "because of [the complainant's] race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. 10 2 Senator Case, a prime sponsor of Title VII, commented

95 Nassar,133 S. Ct. at 2546 (2013) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
96 See id.(declaring majority's determination erroneous in light of existing tort law).
97 See id.
98 ld. at 2547.
99 ld. (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 557 U.S. 167, 190 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
1ooId. (quoting Gross, 557 U.S. at 191 (Breyer, J., dissenting)); see also Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) ("[Alt ...times the [but-for] test demands the impossible. It
challenges the imagination of the trier to probe into a purely fanciful and unknowable state of
affairs.") (O'Connor, J., concurring).
101 See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547 (analyzing Congress' decision to omit "solely" before
"because" from Act).
102 Id.; see 110 CONG. REc. 2728, 13837-138 (1964) (illustrating rejected amendment
language).
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that a "sole cause" standard would render the Act "totally nugatory."10 3
With even the prime sponsor of Title VII himself concluding the
requirement of sole cause in the context of Title VII would render the act
inoperative, the dissent agrees and concludes with a call to action:
"Today's misguided judgment ... should prompt yet another Civil Rights
Restoration Act."1 4
B. The State of the Law Post-Nassar:The Causation Conundrum
Continues
The Nassar Court relied heavily upon its reasoning in Gross v.
FBL FinancialServices, Inc. in determining but-for causation as the proper
standard for retaliation claims in Title VII context 0 5 However, the Gross
Court neither explained exactly what it meant by "but-for causation," nor
clearly articulated the standard to be followed.1 0 6 In fact, up until Nassar,
"chaos and confusion surround[ed] the issue of factual causation in
employment discrimination disparate treatment doctrine. ' 7 Moreover, the
reasoning that the Court employed to arrive at its decision left it open to
interpretation as to whether all federal statutes with similar "but for"
causality language without an explicit mixed motive provision require the
stricter but-for test. 0 8 Though Nassar determined "but-for" causation as
the standard to apply to Title VII retaliation claims, the legal framework
necessary to analyze such claims remains unclear. 0 9 Thus chaos and

103Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547 (discussing one congressional representative's opinion
regarding amendment). According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, "nugatory" is defined as
"of little or no consequence," "having no force," and "inoperative." MERRIAM WEBSTER
DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nugatory (last visited May 16, 2016).
104 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
105 See id.at 2527-28 ("[T]hat opinion [Gross] holds two insights for the present case. The
first is textual and concerns the proper interpretation of the term "because" as it relates to the
principals of causation underlying both § 623(a) [of the ADEA] and § 2000e-3(a) [of Title VII].
The second is the significance of Congress' structural choices in both Title VII itself and the
law's 1991 amendments.").
106See Tananbaum, supra note 17, at 1140 (illuminating Court's reliance upon various
interpretations of "but for" or "cause in fact" standard).
107 See Brian S. Clarke, The Gross Confusion Deep in the Heart of University of Texas
Southwest Medical Center v. Nassar,4 CAL. L. REV. CiR. 75, 75 (2013) (assigning confusion to
Gross). By granting certiorari to hear Nassar,the Supreme Court had "a golden opportunity" to
clarify Gross and "explain the nature and scope of the cause-in-fact standard" in the context of
Title VII. See id. at 76 (explaining issue in Nassar).
108 See Tananbaum, supra note 17, at 1140 (discussing difficulties with applying Gross
ruling).
109 See Stoner v. Ark. Dep. of Corr., 983 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1098 (E.D. Ark. 2013) (declining
to extend Title VII employer liability).
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confusion still run rampant in the circuit courts, as illustrated infra.
Before being abrogated by Nassar, the Fifth Circuit had initially
rejected the "sole cause" interpretation established by Gross in Smith v.
Xerox, which left intact the Price Waterhouse mixed motive framework
and other Title VII cases as precedent under which the lesser causation
standard was found permissible in retaliation cases.110 On the other hand,
the Seventh Circuit foreshadowing Nassar, had already begun to apply
Gross's reasoning that strict but-for causation applies to all federal
discrimination statutes, such as the Americans With Disabilities Act
(ADA)."' The Eastern District of Arkansas has observed and considered
that both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits continue to apply the McDonnel
Douglas framework to retaliation claims, though the Eighth Circuit has yet
to conclusively rule on the matter.1 12 The First Circuit has even expressly
adopted the McDonnell Douglas framework post-Nassar: "[r]etaliatory
termination claims based circumstantial evidence are evaluated using the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework." 113

110 See Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 333 (5th Cir. 2010) (considering mixed-motive
standard); see also Tananbaum, supra note 17, at 1140-43 (discussing Fifth Circuit's approach).
111 See Tananbaum, supra note 17, at 1144 (emphasis added).
The Seventh Circuit
expounded) (expounding on mixed motive cases in much greater detail in Serwatka v. Rockwell
Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2010)). In Serwatka, v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., an
employee alleged that her employer discharged her because she was disabled, in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Id. at 958. The jury found both that the employer
discharged the employee on the basis of her disability and that it would have discharged her
regardless of her condition (i.e., the employer had mixed motives). See Tananbaum, supra note
17, at 1144-45. The Seventh Circuit ultimately found such claim insufficient under the ADA,
interpreting Gross to "bar mixed motives claims under any federal statute not expressly
authorizing them." Id. at 1145; see also Serwatka, 591 F.3d at 962 ("Gross makes clear that in
the absence of any additional text bringing mixed-motive claims within the reach of the statute,
the statute's 'because of' language demands proof that a forbidden consideration-here, the
employee's perceived disability-was a 'but for' cause of the adverse action complained of.").
112 See, e.g., Stoner, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 1098 (citing Bishop v. Ohio Dep't. of Rehab. &
Corr., 529 F. App'x 685 (6th Cir. 2013)); Nicholson v. City of Clarksville, 530 F. App'x 434,
445-46 (6th Cir. 2013); Coleman v. Jason Pharm., 540 F. App'x 302, 303 06 (5th Cir. 2013).
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework provides that in order to make a primafacie
showing of retaliation, the plaintiff must show that she engaged in protected conduct, that she
suffered an adverse employment action, and that a causal nexus exists between the protected
activity and the adverse action. Stoner, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 1097. In Stoner, the court denied
summary judgment on the employer's Title VII retaliation claim where the record permitted a
reasonable juror to conclude that the employer's desire to retaliate the plaintiff for her complaint
was the "but-for" cause of the adverse employment decision. Id. at 1098.
113 See Santos-Santos v. P.R. Police Dep't, 63 F. Supp. 3d 181, 189 (D.P.R. 2014) (citing
Gerald v. University of Puerto Rico, 707 F.3d 7, 24 (1st Cir. 2013)) (explaining requirement for
prima facie showing of retaliation). According to the framework established in McDonnell
Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 189. "If [s]he
succeeds, an inference of discrimination arises, and the burden of production shifts to the
defendant to produce evidence that the challenged employment action was taken for a legitimate
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The district courts within the Second Circuit, however, have tread
cautiously with Nassar's sole causation interpretation in the context of the
Fair Housing Act, and have recently called for clarification on the standard
in the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in Sherman v.
Cnty. of Suffolk. 114 Denying summary judgment to Suffolk County, N.Y.,
on former corrections officer Steven Sherman's claims that he was fired
because of a knee injury and in retaliation for complaining about
discrimination, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York

found that Sherman raised triable questions about whether his injury and
complaint were the "but for" cause of his termination or simply played a
role in the decision, i.e. was a motivating factor. 115 The court observed,
however, that Nassar and conflicting district court decisions within the
Second Circuit left an "open question" about the appropriate causation
standard that may soon need to be resolved, as some district courts in the
circuit have "read the writing on the wall" and concluded that ADA claims
require "but for" causation while others have continued to rely on pre-

non-discriminatory reason." Id.If the employer supplies a legitimate non-discriminatory reason,
then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
"employer's proffered reason is pretextual and that the actual reason for the adverse employment
action is discriminatory." Id.at 189-90. In Santos-Santos, the defendant employer made a prima
facie showing of legitimate reasons for transferring the plaintiff employee to another department,
which she alleged to be retaliation. Id.at 190. The court held that in order to properly defeat
defendants' reasons for the retaliatory actions, plaintiff had to provide evidence to demonstrate
pretext, "which can be shown by such weaknesses, implausabilities, inconsistencies, or
contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable fact
finder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not
act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons." Id.at 190 (citing Gomez-Gonzalez v. Rural
Opportunities, Inc., 626 F.3d 654, 662-63 (1st Cir. 2010)). Since the plaintiff employee failed to
offer evidence that the alleged wrong was pre-textual, the court granted summary judgment for
the defendant. See Santos-Santos, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 190-91 (providing holding of case).
114 71 F.Supp. 3d 332 (E.D. NY 2014); see Ponce v. 480 East 21st St., LLC, 12
Civ. 4828,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122769, *11-12, n.5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013). Discussing Title VII and
Nassar:
Courts have assumed that a plaintiff states an FHA retaliation claim by alleging that
a retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse action - but this assumption was
taken from Title VII standards. The Supreme Court recently [in Nassar] changed
that principle in the Title VII context, holding that a plaintiff must prove that an
illegal motive was the sole reason for the adverse action. Because that decision was
based, in part, on Title VII's statutory scheme and the specific text of its retaliation
provision, this Court would be hesitant to apply that change in law to the FHA.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
115 See Chris Opfer, Court Calls for Second Circuit Clarificationon Causation Standard in
Disability Lawsuits, BLOOMBERG BNA, www.bna.com/court-calls-second-n17179921765 (last
visited March 28, 2016) (discussing need for clarification on application of but-for causation
standard to ADA claims post-Nassar).
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Gross circuit 116
precedent allowing ADA claims to proceed on a mixedmotive theory.
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania, as part of the Third Circuit,
has similarly considered but-for causation post-Nassar in the context of the
ADA and Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in Berkowitz v.
Oppenheimer Precision Products,Inc. 1 The court stated that even if butfor causation applies to the ADA and FMLA, summary judgment was not
proper where the employee presented evidence to rebut the employer's
nondiscriminatory reasons for termination as pretextual, since a reasonable
juror could find "'but-for"' the request for an ADA accommodation and
FMLA leave, the employee would not have been terminated. 8
On the opposite end of the spectrum, a superior court in
Connecticut has flat out rejected the reasoning of Nassar in interpreting
state employment retaliation laws.11 9 While the defendant employer in
Gonska v. Highland View Manor1 20 argued that Connecticut must look to
federal precedent for guidance in the area of employment retaliation, it
follows that the court should apply the but-for causation standard
announced in Nassar1 21 In declining to require but-for causation as the
standard in the state law retaliation provision at issue, the court noted it had
"previously found compelling reasons to believe that our state appellate
courts would not choose to follow the 'but-for' causation standard
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in the Nassar and Gross
cases, in connection with ... state ... retaliation statutes., 122 The court
116 See Opfer, supra note 115. In Sherman v. County of Suffolk, the Eastern District of New
York noted that the Second Circuit has yet to overturn a ruling issued before the Gross and
Nassar decisions, in which the appeals court held that an ADA discrimination plaintiff need only
show that the worker's disability played a motivating role in an adverse employment decision. 71
F. Supp. 3d at 348 (emphasis added) (citing Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326
(2nd Cir. 2000)). The Sherman Court also cited an unpublished opinion rendered after the
Supreme Court decisions in Gross and Nassar in which the Second Circuit held that the mixedmotive standard still applied in ADA cases. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Perry v. NYSARC, Inc.,
424 Fed. App'x. 23 (2d Cir. 2011)).
117 No. CIV. 13-4917, 2014 LEXIS 152533 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2014).
118 See Jay-Anne B. Casuga, Judge Considers Nassar's But-For Standard, Sends ADA,

FMLA
Retaliation
Claims
to
Trial,
BLOOMBERG
BNA,
Oct.
29,
2014,
http://news.bna.com/edln/display/alpha.adp?mode=topics&letter=C&frag id=58560896&item=1
866&prod=edln (discussing but-for standard in context of ADA and FMLA in Berkowitz, 2014
LEXIS 152533).
119 See Gonska v. Highland View Manor, Inc., No. CV126030032S, 2014 WL 3893100, at
*7 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 26, 2014) (declining to follow but-for causation standard in state law
employment retaliation context claims).
120

Id.

121

See id. (arguing applicable standard).
Ild. (citing Bissonnette v. Highland Park Market, Inc., No. HHDCV106014088S, 2014

122

WL 815872, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2014)).
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further stated that "while often a source of great assistance and persuasive
force ... it is axiomatic that decisions of the United States Supreme Court
are not binding on Connecticut courts tasked with interpreting our General
Statutes. Rather, Connecticut is the final arbiter of its own laws. ' , 12 1 In
rejecting the but for test and applying the McDonnell Douglas burden
shifting analysis with the motivating factor standard, the court held that
"[a] plaintiff can establish causation either by showing that the protected
activity was followed close in time by adverse action, or through evidence
of retaliatory animus directed against the plaintiff ...,"24 The court found
the more lenient standard appropriate in the employment context because
using the evidence and considering the unique circumstances of each case,
the trier of fact is ultimately "in the best position to make an individualized
determination of whether the temporal relationship between an1 employee's
25
protected activity and an adverse action is causally significant.
Surprisingly, clarification of the but-for causation standard may be
imbedded in a criminal case decided several months after Nassar. 2 6 In
Burrage v. United States, the Supreme Court examined but-for causation in
the context of a criminal prosecution of Burrage, a drug dealer who was
convicted for the unlawful distribution of heroin that resulted in the death
2
of another person in violation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).1 7
At trial, two medical experts testified regarding the cause
death and determined that because multiple drugs were
system, heroin "was a contributing factor" in the death.1 28
for an acquittal because there was no evidence that heroin

of the victim's
present in his
Burrage argued
was the but-for

id.
Gonska, 2014 WL 3893100, at *9. The ultimate issue considered in Gonska was
"whether the plaintiff [could] show a sufficient causal connection between the exercise of
protected activity and her termination to defeat summary judgment." Id. In finding that the
plaintiff had met this burden, the court made two findings. Id. First, a reasonable trier of fact
could determine that the temporal proximity between the plaintiff's protected activity and her
termination gave rise to an inference of retaliation based on her positive employment record and
in light of her being fired only two months after complaining about the defendant's conduct. Id.
Though the defendant proffered a legitimate reason for her termination, in light of the evidence
given by the plaintiff, summary judgment was inappropriate. Id. Second, there was also direct
evidence of retaliatory animus due to a change in testimony between the incident and the
plaintiff's filing suit from which the trier of fact could draw a reasonable inference that the
reasons proffered for the plaintiff's termination were mere pretext. Id. at *10.
125 See id. at *9 (justifying more lenient standard).
126 See Burrage v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 881, 892 (2014) (holding defendant
distributing
drugs that killed victim not independent cause of death, but-for not met).
127 Id. at 885. "The Controlled Substances Act imposes a 20-year mandatory minimum
123

124

sentence on a defendant who unlawfully distributes a Schedule I or II drug, when 'death or
serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance."' Id.at 885 (citing 21 U.S.C.
§841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)-(C)).
128 Id. at 885-86.
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cause of death, because it was only a contributing factor. 129 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether Burrage could be convicted
under the CSA's "death results" provision, which in turn called for
clarification of the appropriate causation standard. 13
The Court went on to interpret the phrase "results from" in the
CSA to require actual causality, and cited to their holding in Nassar that
"[i]n the usual course," this requires proof "that the harm would not have
occurred" in the absence of -that is, but for-the defendant's conduct."13 1
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia provided two scenarios illustrating
but-for causation. 11 2 First, where A shoots B, who is hit and dies, A
actually caused the death of B, since but-for A's conduct B would not have
died.133 Second, and of particular importance to be discussed infra, Scalia
stated that but-for causation can still result when a predicate act combines
with other factors to produce the result, so long as the other factors alone
would not have done so-if, so to speak, "it was the straw that broke the
camel's back., 13 4 Scalia then illustrates the proverbial "straw that broke
the camel's back" by pointing to a situation in which poison is
administered to a man suffering from multiple diseases. 13 5 The poison is
still a but-for cause of his death, even if the diseases played a role, "so long
16
as, without the incremental effect of the poison, he would have lived. , 1
129

130
131

Id. at 886.
Id. at 885.
See Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 887-88 (quoting University of Tex. Southwestern Medical

Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013)) (defining "results from"). The Model Penal
Code similarly reflects this understanding of but-for causation: "'[c]onduct is the cause of a
result' if 'it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred." Id.at
888 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(1)(a)) (defining "resulting from").
132 Id. at 888.
133 id.
134 Id. Justice Scalia uses the anecdote to illustrate that though there may be thousands of
causes, like "wisps of straw," responsible for a certain result, to be a "but-for" cause of harm the
action must actually do damage equivalent to "breaking the camel's back." Ild.
at 888.
135 id.
136 Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 888 (2014) (emphasis added). Justice Scalia
also uses a baseball game to illustrate but-for requirement. ld. If, for example, the visiting team's
leadoff batter hits a home run in the first inning, and the visiting team goes on to win 1-0,
everyone would agree that the victory resulted from the home run. ld. However, it is
inconsequential that the win was also a result of other necessary factors, like skillful pitching. Id.
There is little rationale to say that an event (the win) was the outcome of an earlier action (the
home run) if that action (the home run) was an extraneous contributing role in generating the
event (the win). ld. Had the winning team won 5 to 2 rather than I to 0, it would be surprising to
find out that the victory resulted from the leadoff batter's home run because under those
circumstances, the home run was only a contributing factor to the win and no longer the but-for
cause. Id. In light of this explanation of but-for causation, the Government needed to prove that
the heroin played a direct role in death, akin to the leadoff batter hitting a home run in the first
inning and the subsequently winning 1-0. ld.
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Using this interpretation of but-for causation, the Court reversed Burrage's
conviction because the district court had improperly instructed the jury that
the Government was required only to prove "that the heroin distributed by
the Defendant was a contributing cause . . . of death., 13 7 The Court
reasoned that since "results from" language requires but-for causation, it
only makes sense that in order to sentence Burrage to a mandatory
minimum sentence of twenty years, the heroin had to be at least one but-for
or independent cause that resulted in the death, like "the straw that broke
'
the camel's back."138
Ultimately, without evidence that the victim would
have lived but for the heroin distributed by Burrage, the conviction had to
be reversed. 3 9
The importance of Burrage in the context of Title VII retaliation
claims is significant, yet subtle. 140 The Court provided additional
clarification of the but-for causation standard that any average layperson
can understand with analogies to baseball and familiar proverbs." 1
Specifically, Justice Scalia's discussion of the causation requirements being
met when the predicate act is "the straw that broke the camel's back"
suggests that in a Title VII retaliation case, the protected conduct could be
142
one of many "but-for" causes leading to the adverse employment action.
Moreover, the opinion also routinely refers to "a but-for" cause as opposed
to "the but-for" cause.1 43 This description of the causation standard
certainly appears to be more akin to the motivating factor standard,
articulated in Price Waterhouse, than the strict sole but-for standard
announced in Gross and Nassar.44 Under both Burrage and Price
Waterhouse, the employer can be motivated by any number of reasons, and
a plaintiff can still prevail so long as she can show that it was the protected
145
conduct that ultimately pushed the employer to take retaliatory action.
Thus, the Burrage decision "must be considered a win" for plaintiff's
counsel, but it remains to be seen whether trial courts will incorporate
137

Id. at 886, 892.

138

id.

Id. at 892. It was conceded that there was no evidence that the victim, Joshua Banka,
would have lived but for his heroin use. See id.
140 See id. at 888 (explaining but-for causation using analogies).
141 See Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 888 (2014) (explaining but-for causation
139

using analogies); see also Tom Harrington, The Rebranding of 'But-For' Causation In Title VII
Cases, LAW360, June 4, 2014, http://www.law360.com/appellate/articles/531781 (highlighting
how Burrage clarified but-for causation in employment law context).
142 See Harrington, supra note 141 (drawing possible inferences from Burrage in context of
Title VII retaliation claims).
143 ld. (noting subtle language shift in articulation of but-for causation standard).
144

id.

145

id.
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Justice Scalia's "straw that broke the camel's back" analogy into jury
instructions
to clarify confusion regarding the applicable causation
1 46
standard.
C. Post-NassarProblems for Plaintiff Litigators
Due to circuit court confusion surrounding the causation standard,
its interpretation and application, it is difficult for plaintiff-employees'
attorneys to uniformly know what to expect in crafting arguments and
defenses. 147 Particularly in litigation concerning Title VII retaliation
claims, there is always back and forth by counsel regarding an employer's
"legitimate business reasons" in making an adverse action against an
employee after they have complained of discrimination, and whether or not
those reasons are merely masking a retaliatory motive. 148 Summary
judgment is proper when there is "no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 149 Retaliation
cases in particular are usually won or lost at the summary judgment phase
by plaintiff's counsel demonstrating, or employer's counsel attacking,
causation.1 50 Consequently, Nassarhas made it easier for employers to win
at the summary judgment stage by "requiring a restrictive view of causation
in workplace retaliation cases. ,1 5 1 Instead of having to prove that
retaliation was at least one of the reasons behind the retaliatory action
complained of, Nassar's holding requires an employee alleging retaliation
52
to prove that retaliation was the sole reason for taking that action.
Ultimately, plaintiff employee litigators wishing to pursue retaliation
claims on behalf of their clients have been left in an uncertain legal

146

id.

147 See Harrington, supra note 141 (discussing implications of but-for causation standard in
Title VII litigation)
148 See Harrington, supra note 141 (discussing implications of but-for causation standard in
Title VII litigation).
149 See Ponte v. Steelcase Inc., 741 F.3d 310, 319 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Cortes-Rivera v.
Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 626 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2010); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a)
("Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-movant, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.").
150 See Harrington, supra note 141 (discussing implications of but-for causation standard in
Title VII litigation).
151 See Grossman & Brake, supra note 30 (summarizing majority opinion in Nassar).
152 See id. (highlighting how restrictive but-for causation in workplace retaliation cases
favors employers); see also Clarke, supra note 107, at 78 (interpreting but-for causation as sole
causation test is unrealistic due to nature of employment decisions).
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53

landscape post Nassar.'

IV. ANALYSIS
A. Tort Don't Comport: Interpreting But-For Causation to Mean

"Sole Cause" Is Inadequate in the Employment Context
Interpreting but-for causation to mean that a plaintiff-employee
must prove that the employer's desire to discriminate or retaliate was the
sole cause of the adverse employment action sets an unrealistic standard
due to the nature of employment decisions where multiple causal factors
come into play. 154 It is one thing to speak of a "but-for" cause in a classic
tort scenario, such as where a car accident results from another car failing
to stop at a red light, because there it is easier to identify the but-for
cause. 5 5 In the employment context, proving but-for causation is not as
clear. 156 In fact, it's like trying to look into the mind of the employer who
obviously has an incentive to hide discriminatory and illegal motivations. 15
As noted by Justice Breyer in his dissent in Gross, "[i]t is an entirely
different matter to determine a 'but-for' relation when we consider, not
physical forces,
but the mind-related characterizations that constitute
8

motive.

15

To equate but-for causation in the employment context as meaning
sole motive is as one employment law scholar put it, "too stupid to take
153 See Grossman & Brake, supra note 30 (summarizing majority opinion in Nassar); Clarke,
supra note 106, at 78 (interpreting but-for causation as sole causation test is unrealistic due to
nature of employment decisions).
154 See Clarke, supra note 107, at 76 ("Logically, every occurrence has a virtually infinite
number of factual causes ... without which the event at issue would not have occurred.").
155See Harrington, supra note 141 (noting but-for causation works better in tort cases as
opposed to employment cases).
156 See Harrington, supra note 141 (noting but-for causation works better in tort cases
as

opposed to employment cases).
157 See id. (describing but-for causation easier to determine in tort context rather than
employment context).
158 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 190 (2009) (Breyer, Souter, & Ginsburg, JJ.
dissenting). Justice Breyer further elaborated that:
[T]o apply "but-for" causation is to engage in a hypothetical inquiry about what
would have happened if the employer's thoughts and other circumstances had been
different. The answer to this hypothetical inquiry will often be far from obvious,
and, since the employee likely knows less than does the employer about what the
employer was thinking at the time, the employer will often be in a stronger position
than the employee to provide the answer.
Id. at 191.
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seriously., 159 Under this interpretation, Dr. Nassar would have to prove
that the only reason the University decided to enforce the affiliation
agreement (which precluded him from working at the Hospital) was in
retaliation for complaining of the discrimination he faced at the hand of Dr.
Levine. 160 Using the sole cause interpretation as the Court did, the fact that
the affiliation agreement existed was enough of a legitimate reason to
preclude Dr. Nassar from proving retaliation. 161
It is key to distinguish the fact that the Hospital was well aware of
the agreement when it verbally extended an offer of employment to D.
Nassar after he informed them of his plan to resign from the University.162
It was not until Dr. Nassar's supervisor, Dr. Fitz, protested to the Hospital
that the affiliation agreement forbade the job offer that retaliation came into
play. 16 It is an undisputed fact that Dr. Fitz was angry with Dr. Nassar for
complaining about Dr. Levine's discrimination and that he sided with Dr.
Levine. 164 Under the motivating factor standard of causation, Dr. Nassar
could surely connect Fitz's comments
to retaliatory conduct, but under the
1 65
strict sole-cause, he could not.
Inherently, this makes little sense and asks the plaintiff to prove the
state of mind of the person or entity accused of retaliation-something that
both Justices Breyer and Ginsburg have expressed concern with. 166 Large
and sophisticated employers of medical and educational professionals, such
as hospitals and universities, most likely have detailed employee policies
and procedures in place, and may not uniformly enforce them. 16 7 The
reality of the situation is that had Dr. Fitz not thrown a fit about Dr. Nassar
working at the Hospital, Dr. Nassar may have well enjoyed employment
there.
Because Dr. Nassar cannot possibly compel Dr. Fitz to admit that
he made sure the agreement was enforced only to spite Dr. Nassar for
complaining about Dr. Levine's discrimination, the application of but-for
causation as sole cause unfairly precludes a legitimate retaliation claim

159 See Clarke, supra note 107, at 76 (acknowledging that but-for causation as sole causation
test is unrealistic).
160 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
161 See discussion supra Part III.A.iv (reviewing Supreme Court's reasoning for heightened
standard).
162 See discussion, supra Part III.A.i (detailing facts of Nassarcase).

163 See discussion supra Part III.A.i (detailing facts of Nassarcase).
164 See discussion supra Part IIA.i (outlining facts of case).

165 See
166 See
167 See
168 See

discussion
discussion
discussion
discussion

supra Part III.A.i (outlining facts of case).
supra.PartIII.A.v (discussing dissenting opinions).
supra Part III.A.v (discussing dissenting opinions).
supra Part III.A.v (discussing dissenting opinions).
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even under protective Title VII legislation. 169 Much of this confusion
stems from the Court's initial decision that but-for causation
is required for
1
70
FBL
v.
Gross
in
ADEA
the
under
claims
retaliation
Taking a closer look at the decision, the Court was all over the
place in its discussion of causation, which ultimately provided mixed
messages. 1 1 Instead of clearly defining the but-for causation standard, it
muddled several interpretations which ranged from the traditional but-for
test found in Prosser & Keeton on Torts, "necessary condition" statutory
language discussed in Burr, and finding but-for causation to exist where a
protected trait was the factor that mattered in the employer's decision
according to Biggins. 2 Given the absence of coherent textual guidance as
to the meaning of but-for causation, the only thing clear in Gross is that
based on the plain meaning of the words the Court used, a protected trait
must be "the but for cause" and "the reason" for the decision, instead of "a"
or "one of several".1 3 Though discussing several different interpretations
of "but-for" causation and how they differ, the Gross Court ultimately
adopted the most restrictive version available, interpreting
"but-for"
1
74
standard.
cause"
"sole
the
require
to
ADEA
the
under
causation
Thus, Gross inadvertently "opened the door for interpreting factual
causation in the disparate treatment context as sole cause.", 175 Though the
Nassar Court reiterated that Title VII specifically provides for the mixed
motive standard for disparate treatment claims, the Court borrowed Gross's
restrictive interpretation of but-for causation as sole causation. 1 6 As
169See discussion supra Part III.A.v (discussing dissenting opinions).
170 See discussion supra Part II.C (discussing determination of but-for causation required for
ADEA retaliation claims).
171 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 180-92 (2009) (Stevens & Breyer, JJ
dissenting). In discussing the applicable causation standard, the Gross Court cited two cases and
a treatise on the law of torts. Id.It cited Hazen PaperCo. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) for the
proposition that the protected trait had to play a role in the employer's decision-making process
as well as having a determinative influence on the outcome, thus concluding that under the
ADEA, age had to be the factor at issue with an employer's decision. See id.at 176 (discussing
Hazen PaperCo. case). The Court then cited Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S.
47 (2007 for the proposition that the statutory phrase "based on" indicates a "but-for" causal
relationship, and that "consideration of the [impermissible factor] must [have been] a necessary
condition"for the adverse action. ld. (citing Burr, 551 U.S. at 63). Lastly, the Court also cited to
the basic statement of the traditional but-for cause test that "[a]n act or omission is not regarded
as a cause of an event if the particular event would have occurred without it." Id. at 176-77
(citing W. Page Keeton ET. AL. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS (5th ed. 1984).

172 See discussion supra Part II.C (explaining Gross Court's interpretation of case and tort
law in finding but-for causation).
173 Clarke, supra note 107, at 78 (citing Gross, 557 U.S. at 176, 180) (emphasis added).
174See id. at 79 (explaining word choice led to sole cause interpretation).
175 ld.(emphasis added).
176See discussion supra Part III.A.iv (discussing Nassar).
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indicated by the dissenters, the majority read two separate statutes together
(i.e., the ADEA and Title VII), and refused to extend the statutorily
prescribed mixed motive provision found under Title VII disparate
treatment claims to Title VII retaliation claims. 17 Moreover, if there can
be any justification for using the strict, sole cause interpretation under the
ADEA, it is because the statute is designed to prohibit discrimination of
one protected trait: age.178
B. Clarify But-For Causation in the Unique Context Title VII
Though the Court had a "golden opportunity" to clarify the nature
and scope of the cause-in-fact standard in Nassar, it missed the mark as
confusion in its application still abounds. 179 The current interpretation as
"sole cause" seems to defy the purpose of the 1991 Amendments to the
Civil Rights Act codifying the motivating factor standard of Price
Waterhouse to increase protections in the disparate treatment context. 180
Despite the plurality and dissent in Price Waterhouse disagreeing on the
term "but-for" causation, both were concerned with the shortcomings of the
strict, traditional standard. 81 The plurality focused its inquiry on whether a
protected trait was a factor in the employment decision at the moment it
was made, describing its approach as "seek[ing] to determine the content of
the entire set of reasons for [the adverse employment] decision.' 18 2 The
dissent similarly explained the standard as satisfied whenever
discrimination was a necessary element of the set of factors that caused the
decision."'
With this in mind, over twenty-five years ago, the Price
Waterhouse Court agreed that but-for cause does not mean sole cause.184
While the dissent labeled the standard "but-for cause," it is evident that the
plurality and dissent acknowledged a version of causation in which
177 See discussion supra Part III.A.iv (stating statutory interpretation discourages application
of rules under one statute to different statute without critical examination).
178 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (detailing relevant provisions of ADEA).
179 See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547; see also supra Part III.B (highlighting differences in

standard application throughout circuits).
180 See supra Part II.B (discussing purpose of Civil Rights Act amendments to codify mixedmotive standard for Title VII claims).
181 See Clarke, supra note 107, at 79 (discussing overlooked cause-in-fact standard in Price
Waterhouse).
182 See id. at 80 (discussing but-for causation in Price Waterhouse when adopting motivating
factor standard in disparate treatment context).
183 See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Price Waterhouse, 470 U.S. 228, 284 (1989).
184 See id. at 79-80 (arguing but-for causation standard articulated in Price Waterhouse
overlooked).
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multiple were considered. 8 5 Though the Nassar Court referred to strict
but-for causation as textbook tort law, the version of causation articulated
by the Court in Price Waterhouse described a more amendable standard
known as the "Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set" ("NESS")
standard. 11 6 The standard holds that a condition is a factual cause of a
specific consequence if it is a "necessary element of a set of' conditions
187
that are sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence[.]
Consequently, both the plurality and dissent agreed that but-for causation in
the disparate treatment context is established when the employer's
consideration of a protected trait was "a" necessary element of the set of
factors that caused the decision, not "the" sole cause as described in
188
Nassar.
Moreover, litigators pursuing retaliation claims should argue the
but-for causation standard articulated by Justice Scalia in Burrage v. United
States.1 89 Depsite Nassar's interpretation of but-for cause, the Burrage
Court articulated a but-for standard in which the protected conduct is "the
straw that broke the camel's back."'1 90 Applying this analogy to a Title VII
retaliation claim using the facts of Nassar, so long as the protected activity
(i.e., the letter complaining about Dr. Levine's discrimination) was "the
straw that broke the camel's back," Nassar's retaliation claim could
prevail.1 91 Dr. Nassar then would have the opportunity to present the jury
his performance evaluations, evidence of interoffice relationships,
managerial hierarchies, and informal norms and customs of the Hospital
and University to determine the final straw that caused the rescinding of the
offer: a long-established custom of strictly adhering to the affiliation
agreement, or Dr. Fitz's resentment
of Dr. Nassar for complaining of
1 92
discrimination, i.e., retaliation.
The NESS or "straw that broke the camel's back" interpretation is
more realistic in employment disputes because it reflects the reality that

185

See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, 240-43 (1989) (clarifying what but-for causation

actually means).
186 See Clarke, supra note 107, at 80-81 (discussing NESS standard).
The NESS standard
was articulated first by Professor Richard Wright in Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REVIEW.
1735, 1790 (1985), and ultimately became incorporated into the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM as the primary standard for factual causation. Id.
187 See Clarke, supra note 107 at 81 (discussing
NESS standard).
188 See id. at 82 (arguing interpretation of but-for causation as sole causation sets unrealistic
standard).
189 See supra notes 127-146 and accompanying text (discussing Burrage v. United States,
134 S. Ct. 881 (2014)).
190 See Harrington, supra note 141 (reflecting on recent causation opinions).
191 See id. (reflecting on recent causation opinions).
192 See id. at 121 (discussing factors jury must weigh in employment cases).
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multiple causal factors routinely affect employment decisions. 93 This
more lenient interpretation of but-for causation is startling akin to the
Court's landmark decision of Price Waterhouse, in which the Court first
endorsed4 the motivating factor standard for Title VII discrimination
19
claims.
Until the standard is clarified further, counsel for Title VII
plaintiffs should use the causation standard and language in Burrage, as it
is a more favorable
interpretation of but-for causation akin to the mixed
195
motive standard.
C. Strategies for Employee Plaintiff Litigators
i. Crystal Clear Causation: Detailed Jury Instructions
Since Nassar, courts struggle with articulating a uniform standard
that jurors will understand as meeting the "but-for requirement." 196 As
Justice Ginsburg predicted in Nassar:
[T]he Court shows little regard for the trial judges who will
be obliged to charge discrete causation standards when a claim
of discrimination 'because of,' e.g., race is coupled with a claim
of discrimination 'because' the individual has complained of
race discrimination. And jurors
will puzzle over the rhyme or
19
reason for the dual standards. 7
For example, some jury instructions in the Fourth Circuit use the
term "determinative effect" when defining the "but-for" relationship, which
yielded an instruction similar to "if not for the employee's protected
conduct, employer would not have imposed a materially adverse action."19 8
Additionally, jurors from the Eighth Circuit were greatly confused by
illustrated by causation language such as "proximate cause of death, " "a
cause of death that played a substantial part in bringing about the death,"
"the death must have been either a direct result of or a reasonably probable

193 See Clarke, supra note 107, at 76 (discussing Price Waterhouse "but-for" causation).

194 See supra Part II.B (discussing holding of Price Waterhouse and subsequent codification
of motivating factor standard).
195 See Harrington, supra note 141 ("[W]e've come almost full circle since the landmark
decision of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins in which the Supreme Court endorsed a motivating
factor standard for discrimination claims.")
196 See id. (discussing implications of but-for causation standard in Title VII litigation).
197 See Univ. of Tx. Sw. Med. Ctr. V. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2535 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
198 See Harrington, supra note 141 (illustrating problems with how causation standard
applied to jury in Title VII litigation).
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consequence of the cause and except for the cause the death would not
have occurred," as evidenced in Burrage. 99 In Burrage the Supreme Court
found the "contributing cause" instruction upheld by the Eighth Circuit
inappropriate.20 0 On the other hand, Nassar phrased the standard as "the
unlawful retaliation would not have occurred
in the absence of the alleged
20 1
wrongful action or actions of the employer."
A solution to jurors struggle with instruction in the context of Title
°
VII may be found in the criminal context of Burrage.202
2 The Government
argued that due to distinctive problems associated with drug overdoses, in
which multiple drugs are present in the victim's system, but-for causation
should not apply. 203 The Government proposed that so long as the heroin
distributed by the defendant contributed to an aggregate force, it was a butfor cause of death, i.e. a contributing factor.20 4 The Burrage Court rejected
this "permissive" interpretation of causation in light of the language
Congress chose, which required death "to result from" use of the
unlawfully distributed drug and not from a "combination of factors," as
Justice Scalia noted, "but-for causation is20 not
nearly the insuperable barrier
5
be.,
to
out
it
makes
Government
that the
In the criminal context of Burrage, forensic toxicologists could not
prove the victim would have lived had he not consumed the heroin. 206
Therefore, the Court did not want the jury to guess how much of a
contributing factor the heroin played, where the experts could only attest it
would be "very less likely" the victim would have died because
"uncertainty of that kind cannot be squared with the beyond-a-reasonable
doubt standard applied in criminal trials or with the need to express
criminal laws in terms ordinary persons can comprehend.20 There are no
hard numbers, and employers can mask easily subjective motivations and
prejudices.20 8
Accordingly, plaintiff litigators should articulate
contributing cause instructions, as retaliation for complaining of protected
activity may be one of several contributing causes that ultimately "breaks

199 See
200 id.
201 id.
202See
203 See
204 See

Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 886 (describing proposed jury instructions).

supra Section III.B (examining but-for causation, including Burrage case).
Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 886 (discussing procedural history of case).
id.(holding defendant-distributor cannot be convicted absent evidence victim would

have lived but for heroin use).
205 See id. at 891 (applying "but-for" causation to drug cases).
206See id. at 885 (discussing toxicologist report).
207See id.at 892 (reconciling meaning of "results from" with policy concerns).
208See supra 169-70 and accompanying text (highlighting advantages to employers under
new paradigm).
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V. CONCLUSION
Causation is a confusing subject in general, but the context in
which the standard applies matters. Furthermore, the seminal case on the
subject in the context of employment discrimination, University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, has complicated the causation
analysis. Though the majority characterized its interpretation of but-for
causation to mean sole cause, it does not accord with reality in the
workplace. Employees, like Nassar, will not be able to bring retaliation
claims where the employer can point to at least one legitimate reason for
the adverse employment decision.
Moreover, it is questionable whether juries will be able to
comprehend the subtle differences in causation language, such as
"motivated by" or "solely because of." This problem, however, can be
rectified by proper jury instructions. As discussed supra, putting causation
requirements in plain language that juries can understand is critical.
Although it is remains to be seen whether trial courts will incorporate
Justice Scalia's "straw that broke the camel's back" analogy into jury
instructions, trial courts should consider it since it because it replaces tort
technicality with common sense. Retaliation claims involve stories that
jurors can relate to, beginning with what happened to the employee and
leaving it to the jurors to the reasons. With simpler instructions which
clarify exactly what the plaintiff employee needs to prove, hopefully there
can be happier endings in Title VII retaliation cases post-Nassar.
Katherine Stark Todd

209

See supra 169-70 and accompanying text.

